His first hundred days have been scrutinised by the whole world, and the doctrine that now structures his administration is America First — on all issues. For Morocco, this second term of Donald Trump could carry major consequences for Morocco United States relations, good or bad. GGSF Policy Brief N°01 examines, through a Moroccan lens, what the first hundred days of this second term mean for the Kingdom.
What follows are the brief’s key takeaways. The full analysis — the options, the points of vigilance and the recommendations — is in the document.
Key takeaways on Morocco United States relations
- “America First”, applied across the board. The United States will no longer systematically take the lead in resolving international crises, and the dismantling of USAID reflects a gradual disengagement from several global issues. Peacekeeping missions are no longer a priority to maintain indefinitely.
- Watch MINURSO and Staffan de Mistura. The State Department favours conflict-resolution negotiations outside the UN system, so a shift in the American position on the UN peacekeeping mission in the Sahara — and on the special envoy’s role — should be expected.
- Duke Buchan III is the signal to read closely. The new US Ambassador to Morocco is a longtime Trump loyalist whose 2017–2021 tenure in Spain left him fluent in the region’s security and trade files. His appointment points to an effort to consolidate the 2020 recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara.
- Bourita’s Washington visit is tangible progress. Marco Rubio reportedly reiterated US support for the autonomy plan as the sole basis for a solution. Behind-the-scenes discussions may be laying the groundwork for a high-profile announcement aimed at further isolating the Polisario Front.
- Morocco is the region’s only natural mediator in the Sahel. It remains the one country able to engage all regional actors. With the US withdrawal from Niger in September 2024, Morocco could become Washington’s privileged relay for counterterrorism — allowing the administration to claim a win without direct intervention.
- The 10% tariff cuts both ways. Lower than the EU’s 20% and Tunisia’s 28%, it is a relative advantage for textiles and agribusiness — 25% and 30% of Moroccan exports to the US in 2023 — and could attract European relocations, notably in free zones like Tanger Med, where exports grew 12% in 2024. It also introduces uncertainty that can deter investment decisions.
- The Chinese-investment exposure is the sharpest risk. Gotion’s $1.3 billion gigafactory in Kenitra sits directly in the path of US measures against Beijing. Chinese investment accounted for 15% of Morocco’s industrial FDI in 2024.
- The FTO question is live. GGSF reads a Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of the Polisario Front as a realistic and strategically viable outcome, given the administration’s posture toward Iran and the arguments advanced in Washington.
What to hold in view
The risk is not a reversal of the Rabat–Washington relationship but its volatility: a transactional White House, a European Union that could retaliate against US tariffs and indirectly hit Moroccan exports, and intensifying great-power rivalry. Morocco’s room for manoeuvre lies in the equilibrium it has maintained between Western, Asian and African partners — and in converting political support into institutional reality.
